The story of how Mintoff whored Malta out to Gaddaffi, in Alex Sceberras Trigona's own words

Muammar Gaddafi and Dom Mintoff acknowledge the adulation of the crowds who have 'spontaneously gathered' outside the Auberge de Castille, to greet the two men who saved them from terrible oppression by Evil Britain.

1 September 2009

By Dr. Alex Sceberras Trigona LL.D., M.A.(Oxon.) Former Foreign Minister of Malta and International Secretary, Malta Labour Party

When Colonel Gaddaffi’s Revolution overthrew King Idris on the First of September, 1969, one of his primary objectives was to free Libya. Although Libya was independent since 1951 it was not completely ‘free’ because of the presence of foreign military bases on its territory.

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No wonder then that on his first visit to Gaddaffi whilst still Leader of the Opposition with Paul Xuereb, later President of the Republic of Malta, and Salvu Sant, later President of the Party, in February 1971 Mintoff found not only words of comfort from his host but an understanding partner actively set on assisting him in all possible ways in closing Malta’s foreign military bases.

He was even ready to support him whether through underwriting or financing once in government to achieve this goal as he indeed did in a most timely and crucially significant manner.

On the first visit of Colonel Gaddafi to Malta on the 25-26th November 1973 immediately after the October Yom Kippur war when President Sadat’s simultaneous use of the ‘oil weapon’ against the West turned the lights out in Europe but also threatened to bring to a halt Malta’s industry, economy and Mintoff’s quest for freedom altogether as we did not have a strategic energy reserve of our own yet, the provision of petroleum at favourable prices was promised by Gaddaffi in bilateral talks with Mintoff.

He was met at the airport by Governor-General Sir Anthony Mamo and Prime Minister Dom Mintoff. Wherever he went, President Gaddafi was cheered by the crowds, many of these having gathered spontaneously.

During his short stay Gaddafi visited the Malta Drydocks, Gnien Gaddafi, the Hypogeum, the Moslem Cemetery and toured over Gozo by a helicopter specially brought over from Tripoli.

What if Mintoff had not found this partner? Would he have sought closure anyway? It might have arguably been all the more difficult – if not impossible – for Mintoff elected PM again in June 1971 to negotiate the closure of the British/NATO military bases in Malta without this steadfast support from Libya.

That consistent support remained most relevant throughout the 7 year period until final closure on the 31st March 1979 when, as agreed in the 1972 Anglo-Maltese Agreement, the last British troops withdrew from Malta after 179 years.

The large number of bilateral co-operation treaties signed and implemented in this period between Libya and Malta demonstrate that this was the highest historical period of closest collaboration.

It was the first time that the two countries were so close together on foreign policy not because outside rulers ordered this but because their own national leaders willed it so.

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Gaddafi was the first Head of State to visit Malta from the 19th till the 21st December 1974 just one week after Malta became a Republic.

During his stay Col Gaddafi met Prime Minister Mintoff at Castille and discussed amongst other subjects petroleum and the Kalafrana port project.

During this second visit of his he also signed an agreement setting up a Libyan-Maltese Holding Company to promote Libyan investment in industry and tourism in Malta.

Gaddafi paid visits to the General Workers Union and visited the Polytechnic where he addressed the students, and the Malta Drydocks where he inspected progress on work on the floating dock being constructed there for Libya.

Gaddafi also made a speech in the Maltese House of Representatives.

Gaddafi also inaugurated the Libyan Cultural Institute sited symobolically instead of the British Main Guard in the main square of Valletta just opposite the President’s Palace and Parliament.

On his third visit to Malta between the 22nd and 23rd May, 1976, Col Gaddafi again addressed Polytechnic students and publicly promised to help Malta get rid of all military bases.

He attended an MLP Mass Rally at Cospicua and met the Cabinet at Castille.

The highlight of this visit was the award of Malta’s highest honorary award, the “Gieh ir-Repubblika”, to Col Gaddafi by the President of the Republic Sir Anthony Mamo. The ceremony was boycotted by the Nationalist Party, indeed no shadow Ministers or MPs from that party were present.

During a press conference Colonel Gaddafi stated that Libya would not assist Malta if it joined an alliance such as NATO.

During his fourth visit to Malta between the 1st and 3rd July, 1978, Colonel Gaddafi attended an MLP Mass Meeting at Birzebbugia where he assured Malta of support in case of aggression.

He also laid the foundation stone of the Paola Mosque and Islamic Centre, and visited Gozo for the first time.

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‘Freedom’ in the sense of freedom from foreign military bases then was a unifying strand in Maltese Libyan relations at least until 1979. This common even ideological understanding of freedom took us quite far together.

However, agreeing on ‘Freedom from …’ did not also mean agreeing on ‘Freedom to …’. Mintoff had originally declared in March 1972 that he had sought a 7 year base agreement in order to free Malta from its economic dependence on having to lease out military bases.

Come 1979 – he promised quite threateningly – a truly economically viable and free Malta could autonomously decide whether to grant military bases to whosoever it chose on ideological grounds and not because of economic necessity.

This notwithstanding he strove relentlessly on from 1972 to attain an internationally recognized status of Neutrality for Malta to be adopted immediately after the bases’ closure.

The Europeans required to be coaxed even in writing by President Jimmy Carter to accept this proposal.

Colonel Gaddafi visited Malta for the 31st March 1979 celebrations on the closure of the British/NATO military bases. He addressed the public at the recently restored Mediterranean Conference Centre, where he assured the crowds gathered there of continued Libyan financial assistance to Malta and he also promised to urge other Arab states to extend further their assistance to Malta.

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Colonel Gaddaffi and Mintoff signed the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation in November 1984 recognizing Malta’s Neutrality together with a Protocol on Security signed by Ali Treiki and myself.

‘Freedom to …’ also meant, amongst other things, to free others. This was understood in different measures in Malta and Libya. Libya’s actions of actively supporting as many liberation movements’ struggles worldwide did not find an ally in the Maltese Government although Mintoff’s was the first European Government to give the PLO an Embassy in Malta and full diplomatic recognition and privileges in 1973 together with substantial humanitarian and educational support.

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A recurring theme of bilateral disagreement throughout the 70s was the question of the delimitation of the delimitation of the Continental Shelf. Through the wise intervention of the Chancellor of Austria Bruno Kreisky, Colonel Gaddaffi flew to Malta from Vienna on the 13th March 1982 and agreed to refer the matter of the Continental Shelf to the International Court of Justice [ICJ] in The Hague and an agreement to this effect was signed by Foreign Minister Abdul Ati El Obeidi and myself. T

he two sides also accepted the ICJ judgement and this agreement signed by Minister Hassan Abdulati El Barghati and myself on the 10th November 1986 was later ratified by our Parliament as Act III of 1987, now recorded as Chapter 316 of the Laws of Malta.

What remains so amazing 22 years later is that the legal certainty imparted by the ICJ judgement to the delimitation of the Continental Shelf has not been sufficiently exploited since by the PN Government with any oil production activity whatever in the rich zone delimited to Malta; nor has the PN concluded, as promised, any extension westwards or eastwards of the ICJ determined delimitation line.

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At the governmental level, Mintoff had already started by convening in Malta in 1972 the Quadripartite Talks with Italy, Libya and Tunisia to explore ways and means of carrying out Mediterranean projects.

Mintoff articulated his well supported Mediterranean policy best in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in the 70s and 80s much before the Barcelona process was launched in 1995.

First of all by 1973 in Dipoli, Finland he had ensured that in addition to the 35 European states together with the USA and Canada all Mediterranean riparian states should thenceforth be invited to make their contributions. Libyan diplomats took the floor on a number of occasions thereafter thanks to Mintoff’s initiative.

Then in a classic use of the consensus rule he introduced a whole Mediterranean Chapter to the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 which should still be essential reading for anyone who is sincerely interested in Mediterranean affairs.

This was followed up by the First Experts Meeting on the Mediterranean held at the newly restored Mediterranean Conference Centre in Valletta for seven whole weeks on the eve of the historic 31st March, 1979.

Various projects for political, economic and cultural co-operation were submitted and considered there as they would be in subsequent Mediterranean meetings afterwards. B

y the time of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe being held in Stockholm in the early eighties we were also advancing proposals for naval disarmament in the Mediterranean as contemplated in the Helsinki Final Act.

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One most relevant conclusion here of the First Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Non-Aligned Countries of the Mediterranean in Valletta, 1984 now set up as a process, was its unanimous Appeal to the riparian States of the North of the Mediterranean which was in effect a Mediterranean Non-Aggression Pact in the making.

In essence it held the following:- On the understanding that none of the Northern riparian States would allow their territories [including bases on their territories] to be used for acts of aggression against the Southern riparian States, these Southern riparian States would reciprocally not allow their territories to be used for acts of aggression against the Northern riparian States.

This became most relevant in the beginning of 1986 when US air-force units had already engaged Libyan units over the Gulf of Sirte in January.

When the situation escalated to a threat of US use of force against the Libyan mainland in the beginning of April we had taken four initiatives.

First I had called an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council, with great difficulty it being a Saturday because of a “threat to peace” when it did indeed meet to consider our appeal for peace in our region to be maintained and that any disputes were better solved as the UN Charter provided namely by peaceful settlement.

The US’s threat to use force went against the Charter and threatened not only Libya but the region as a whole as our Ambassador the late George Agius ably argued in the UNSC. T

The debate which opened on Saturday resumed on Monday when we termed the threat as having become “an imminent threat to peace”.

It is a sad story of the UN’s limited powers in not stopping the notified aggression that Monday to Tuesday night – an act of aggression taking place even when as the jargon has it “the UNSC is seized of the dispute” even that is during the discussion on the dispute – flouting this highest institution dedicated to peace and global security.

Secondly, on Monday evening the PM of Libya Jadallah Azouz At-Talhi accepted our suggestion to come to Malta to meet the US Ambassador who had promised to meet him here for an eleventh hour attempt by us to save the day through direct bilateral talks.

When he came to Castille and met PM Karmenu Mifsud Bonnici, Mintoff and myself however we kept on waiting for the US Ambassador who did not turn up.

Third, I had from the previous week started reminding one by one the Governments of Greece, Italy, France and Spain of the NAM Appeal not to allow their territories to be used in acts of aggression against southern mediterranean states or else these would no longer be bound by the non-aggression commitment.

It took longer coming down the Atlantic from the UK to Gibraltar without overflying Spain or France to enter the Mediterranean. It also became sufficiently exposed along a longer route especially in the Mediterranean to be noticed.

Fourth, as soon as Prime Minister Karmenu Mifsud Bonnici was informed of so many unidentified and unauthorised aircraft approaching our region he immediately gave Libya the alert – one whole hour ahead of the air-strike hitting the target, thus possibly saving Gaddaffi’s life, though not unfortunately his daughter’s or other innocent victims’ lives.

Apart from customary international rules of good-neighbourly relations our [now abolished] Libyan-Maltese Security Protocol bound us to inform each the other of any threat to our security or defence.

Fifth, following the shooting of a missile over Lampedusa in April 1986 prompted Italy to suspend diplomatic relations with Libya. It was through our good offices that the two countries got back on track in a matter of seven months after the incident when I managed to get the two countries’ Foreign Ministers Andreotti and Maghour to meet together in Malta’s Foreign Ministry.

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The other foreign policy element in the GPC’s mandate last March has just been accomplished: “The GPC, once again, maintains that Libyan citizen and political hostage Abd-al-Basit al-Miqrahi is innocent and entrusts the secretariat of the General People’s Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation to continue efforts for his release.”

The release of Abd-al-Basit al-Miqrahi on the 20th August, 2009 completes the thawing of Libya’s frozen international relations – frozen for nearly 2 decades because of Lockerbie, although the negative effects on Malta’s reputation have not yet been cleared.

These two decades could easily be termed as frozen, lost or nameless decades insofar as Libya’s international relations are concerned. The future for enhanced bilateral and multilateral co-operation beckons now.

We have already had fruitful talks in Libya in this regard with H.E. Suleiman Shahoumi, Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the GPC last October, 2008, when Party Leader Dr. Joseph Muscat and I visited Tripoli. We set up two Committees one on Energy and Economic affairs, the other on Political Affairs.

A delegation led by Ambassador Mohammed El-Badri participated in our activities celebrating the 30th anniversary of the closure of all British/NATO military bases here last March when our Committees started their work.

This visit of H.E. Suleiman Shahoumi, Foreign Secretary of the GPC together with his distinguished delegation to participate in this review of the last 40 years gives us further courage that our bilateral relations can be rekindled.

In summary, I have tried to sketch out elements of what could easily be called the “GOLDEN AGE” of Malta Libya relations.

The strong commonality of fundamental views shared between Gaddaffi and Mintoff was really the heart of the matter. They essentially agreed that their countries’ true freedom was to be achieved through the closure of foreign military bases which they succeeded in accomplishing. This bonded Libya and Malta even more together as the application of the 1984 Security Protocol demonstrated so well when needed during the air-strike in April of 1986.

The RCC’s 3rd objective of “social justice” was also deeply shared by Mintoff who successfully pressed on Gaddaffi the international or at least the bilateral meaning of this noble goal. Libya’s consistent support for Malta during the Golden Age by providing oil at favourable prices in an international market that had seen oil prices rocketing 10, 20 even 30 times higher in a few weeks was greatly appreciated by most Maltese whose electricity bills were never alarming or exhorbitant in those days.

It did enable Mintoff not to have to increase taxes to pay for the oil-price increase and it also helped him to introduce domestic measures of social justice in the housing, health, education and welfare spheres with greater ease.

In the difficult transition period 1972-1979 when the military bases were gradually being closed down piece by piece also to stagger and thus buffer the unemployment impact on the economy, alternative employment in Libya for Maltese reached a plateau of around 7,000 which in effect constituted by sheer numbers and pay the biggest buffer indeed.

Continuous exchanges of views between the relevant Ministers on both sides smoothed out numerous administrative problems like national insurance contributions, pension rights, industrial relations and terms and conditions of work as shown by the varied range of international treaties concluded then in this regard.

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Mintoff’s Labour Government was constantly seeking to attract foreign direct investment aimed mainly at job creation. Pressing the Libyans in this regard was natural and Libya was extremely forthcoming.

Dr. Noel Zarb Adami will tell you more about Libyan investment in Malta in heavy and numerous light industries and hotels and hotel complexes and their employment absorption effect.

Other measures taken by Libya which also helped job creation were for example the Fishing Agreements which attracted youngsters to enter the trade because of free and unhindered access to the lush untapped huge fishing zones on the very long coastline of 1700km. whilst also attracting a number of foreign partners with modern technology.

The Banking Agreement also enabled jobs not to be lost and in fact increased by easing the strain on payments [as explained above in footnote five] making Maltese exporters or service providers thus more competitive than their European counterparts.

On the initiative of PM Karmenu Mifsud Bonnici, the freedom of movement of peoples between the two countries was enormously enhanced during the international recession of the time, by allowing all movement to be not only visa-free but merely on the basis of identity cards or car licences.

Thus Libyan entrepreneurs found it easier to travel to Malta on the day they so desired if only to effect some changes in their portfolio at the BOVI, or to holiday here with their families being Malta’s highest rated shoppers, or for Board of Directors meetings of Companies which Libyans increasingly registered here.

This “GOLDEN AGE” in our bilateral relations is no more. There is no doubt about this. There is no special relationship between us anymore. Many contributed to construct that Golden Age in roughly the first 20 of the last 40 years. Many more contributed to destroy that Golden Age in roughly the last 20 years.

What history teaches us is that up to now it was the exception and not the rule that our two peoples had phenomenal leaders who easily understood each other on fundamentals and promptly found so many areas of mutually beneficial agreement for their peoples.

The question therefore is not, “Can we nostalgically just reverse and go back to the GOLDEN AGE?”

Instead, we should be more pragmatically asking ourselves the following questions:-

1. Can we start working for greater understanding between our two peoples?

2. Can we start working on how to improve bilateral relations which are at an all-time low?

3. Can we start identifying, designing and implementing elements of a New Strategic Relationship with the objectives of Freedom and Social Justice bilaterally and in the Mediterranean?

Yes, we can!

Though a cliché now, this is really the obvious and the only answer! Let us start working together towards these ends.
We made it then!
Let’s make it again!
25/08/2009